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This contribution belongs to a category of papers that attempts to determine the ef-
fccts of environmental regulation on the growth of an individual firm. It extends the
existing literature in at least two ways. First, our pollution function explicitly deals
with t.he facl. Lhal, it is more di(ficult to reduce pollution by abatement activities when
pollution is already low. Second, accotding to our knowledge it is for the first time that
marketable pollution permits are incorporated in a dynamic model of the firm.
In the paper we establish the effects of a pollution tax and marketable permits on the
behavior of tt~e firm. For the tax model as well as the marketable permits model we
prove that the equilibrium is stable and approached monotonically, and we derive for-
tnul.~.ti for opl.imal invc~stmcnt policics. I~urthcrmorc~, we carry out a phase plane analysis
for Lhe pollntion tax case, and, linally, a condition is obtained under which long run firm




One of the most important problems of firm behavior in practice these days is how to
react on environmental regulation. The government has several policy instruments at its
disposal to give the firm an incentive to reduce pollution.
In case environmental problems develop smoothly and gradually it is well known that
market-based approaches, like taxes and marketablo permits, have important efficiency
advantages over pollution standards, thus restricting pollution emissions directly (see
e.g. Baumol and Oates (1971)). But, as argued by Hahn and Stavins (1991), in practice
political and technological constraints can occur that lead to a poor performance of these
market-basecl instruments. Therefore, it is important to recognize that the nature of in-
dividnal cnvirunn,rntal prol,l~~niti c~;rn ,Irainatic~ally a(firt thc~ choicc uf prcfcrrccl policy
instruments. 7'hus, for exarnple, for highly localized pollution problems with threshold
damage functions (e.g. Dasgupta (1982), Figure 8.3), source-specific standards may be
appropriate, whereas for pollution problems characterized by more uniform mixing over
larger geographical areas, market-based approaches may be particularly desirable. This
leads to the conclusion that the ideal policy package contains a mixture of instruments,
with taxes, marketable pcrmits and standards each used in certain circumstances to reg-
ulatc thc suurccs of cnvironmcntal damagc (Baumol and Oates (1988), p. 190).
Ilence, in detennining a theoretical [rarnework (or establishing the effects of environ-
mental regulation on the firm's investment policy, each of the above mentioned policy
instruments should be addressed. Contributions in this area include Helfand (1991,
standards), Kort, Van Loon and Luptacik (1991, tax) and Xepapadeas (1992, tax f
standards).
1'he aim of this paper is to establish the optimal dynamic behavior of a firm facing either
imposition of a pollution tax or a market for pollution permits. Here the specification
of the pollution function is improved compared to models in, e.g., Kort, Van Loon and
Luptacik (1991) and Xepapadeas (1992). In these contributions a given abatement ex-
pcnditnrc I~~ads to a givcn pollntion rcduction, which is thus irrespective of the amount of
pullutiuu ~'ausecl Ly the prodnctiuu process. '1'his suggests that pollution can be driven
to zero or even become negative, and, indeed, in these models a constraint occurs to
prevent that pollution becomes negative. In our formulation we adopt the more realistic
assumption that marginal costs of abatement increase sharply as the level of pollution
shrinks, which implies that driving pollution to zero is very expensive if not impossible.
A dynamic rnodel of the firm in which the firm faces a pollution tax is developed in3
Sc~ct,ion 2. lu Sc~ct,iun :3 wc solvc~ Lhis rnodcl by performing a stability analysis, deriving
neL presenL valuc forrnulas and dcvelopiug dynarnic adjustment paths. In Section 4 we
consider a firm that has to buy marketable pollution permits in order to be allowed to
pollute the environment, and we compare the results with the tax case. The paper is
concluded in Section 5.
2 Pollution tax model
Consider a firm that has the possibility to invest in two different sorts of capital goods.
One is productive but also causes pollution as an inevitable byproduct. The other one is
non-productive but cleans pollution. The firm's pollution function is given by E(Kr, K2)
which satisfics:
E(lír, KZ) ~ 0 for all Kr ~ 0 and Kz ~ 0; E(O, ICz) - 0 (1.1)
E,,.,(Ií~,líz) ~ o; E~..,h~,(Kr,K~) ~ o (l.a)
hh,(líi,líl)Gllfurall lii~U; l.hzhz(li~,h~)~llforalllír~0 (1.3)
EK,K~(Kr, líz) - Eh,F,(Iír,Iíz) G 0 (1.4)
Ex~ti~Ílír,lís)Eti-zKz(Ií~,líz) ~ ~En,x2(lít,líz)~~ (1.5)
in which:
E(lí~, Ií2) :(low of pollution generated by the firrn,
being a function of Kr and líZr
Kr - Ií~(t) : stock of productive capital goods at time t
Kz - Ií2(l) : stock of abatcrnent capital goods aL tirne t
(1.1) implies that pollution output is positive as long as the productive capital stock is
positive. Thcrefore, pollution is never non-existent when the firm produces.
~Stock characteristics of environmental pollution are not considered here. This is because according
to Xepapadeas (1992) stock effects are particularly important in a model where the objective is to
maximize some welfare indicator and not in a model where private profits are maximized. The pollution
(low generated by the finn contributes to the total pollution stock of the whole economy.4
(1.2) states that pollution increases in a convex way with increasing productive capital
stock, for a givcn Icvcl of abatrnicnt capital stock.
(1.3) means that pollution output is smaller the larger the current level of abatement
capital stock, for a given positive stock of productive capital. (1.3) also implies that we
have diminishing returns to abatement capital stock.
(1.4) states that the increase of pollution, due to an extra unit of productive capital
stock, is smaller the larger the level of abatement capital stock. Alternatively, the de-
crease in pollution output, due to an extra unit of abatement capital stock, is larger the
larger the current productive capital stock.
Because Eh~,r,., G 0 and EF,h., ~ 0, our formulation has the realistic property that more
abatement investments are required to reduce pollution with some fixed amount as the
level of pollution shrinks.
In Xepapadeas (19J`l) ancl in Kort, Van Loon and Luptacik (1991) the pollution func-
tion is separablc in lí~ and líz. '1'his implies that a given amount of abatement capital
stock leads to a given reduction of pollution, irrespective of the current level oí pollution,
and also that pollution can be zero. In our formulation we got rid of these unrealistic
features.
Finally, (1.2), (1.3) and (1.5) imply that function E is strictly convex in (Kr,Kz).
According to Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1990, p. 330) Lhe most important response of a
firm to environmental regulations is investment in costly new equipment for pollution
abatcment. Therefore, by introducing abatement capital stock as a state variable we as-
sume that the firm can build up abatement capital. Both capital goods evolve according
to the standard capital accumulation dynamics:
Kr - h - ac Iír, Kr(0) ~ 0 (2)
líz - Iz - azlíz, líz(0) ~ 0
in which:
Ir - li(l) : ratc of invcstmcnt in productivc capital goods at tirnc t
Iz - Iz(t) : ratc of investment in abatement capital goods at time t
ai : clepnr.ial.iuu ratc- of thc prodn~ tivc~ capital guods
(ar 1 0 and constant)
az : depreciation rate of the abatement capital goods
(az ~ 0 and constant)
(3)5
Gross earnings of the firm are given by the instantancous revenue function S- S(Kl).
Assurne that S is twice continuously differentiable, S(Kr) ~ 0 for Kr ~ 0, S'(Kl) ~ 0,
S"(Kr) G 0, S(0) - 0. [Function S(lír) is defined as revenue after maximization with
respect to variable inputs, e.g. labor].
Investment is costly. Let, for i- 1,2, C;(I;) be the cost of investment with C; a convex
and increasing function, C;(!;) 1 0, C;'(I;) ~ 0, C(0) - 0.
The objective of the firm is to maximize the net cash flow stream:
maximize: J~[S(ICi) - Cr(Ir) - C~(IZ) - rE(lít, líZ)]exp(-rt)d1 (4)
in which:
r: discount rate (r ~ 0 and constant)
r: pollution tax rate (r ~ 0 and constant)
As argued by Pindyck (1991) investment expenditures are largely irreversible; that is,
they are mostly sunk costs that cannot be recovered. This comes from the fact that
usually capital is firm or industry specific, that is, it cannot be used productively by a
different firm or in a different industry. To include irreversibility of investment in our
model we add the following two non-negativity restrictions:
1~ ~ 0 (5)
h 1 0 (6)
'I'hr di~cisi~m prublrin uf Lho linu is tu cl~~t~,rinin~~ ~ui invrsl.nirnl. pal,h. {li(l), ~l(f.)} ovcr
an infinite planning period [0, oo), such that the objective functional in (4) is maximal,
subject to the constraints (2), (3), (5) and (6).
3 Solution
"Ib obtain the optimality conditions for the optitnal coutrol problern described at the end
of the previous section we use Pontryagin's maximum principle (see e.g. Feichtinger and
Ilartl (1986)). The current value Hamiltonian and Lagrangian for this problem are:6
ll - S(ltit) - Ct(It) - G`x(Ix) - rF.(lí~, líx) -~ at(Jt - atlít) f~z(fx - azKz) (7)
L-llfvtltfnxlx
in which:
a; -~;(t) : co-state variable belonging to lí; at time t; i- 1,2
p; - rt;(t) : dynamic Lagrange multiplier belonging to the constraint
I;~Oattimet;i-1,2
The necessary optimality conditions are:
-C.;(I~) t a~ f n~ - ~
-C~(Iz)f~xfrtx-~
ai -(r f at)~~ - S'(Kt) f rEh-,(lít,líx)
~z - (r t ax)~z f rEh.z(Itt, !íx)
7t ? ~, ntli - ~
riz?0, rlxlx-p
If furthermore the transversality conditions








hold for evc,ry (casible solution (lí~, lí1), then (9)-(14) are also sufficient for optimality
sincc thc maxiniircd llamiltonian is concave in (lí~, Kz).7
3.1 Stability analysis
To get insight into the dynamics oí the optimal solution ofour model, a stability analysis
has to be carried out. By linearizing the non-linear canonical system around the steady
state ( Ií~, !í2i a~, aZ, h, I2) we obtain the Jacobi matrix evaluated at the equilibrium.
An optimal steady state is a solution of:
Il-a~K1-0
Ia - azKz - 0
(r f ai)a~ - S'(líl) f rEh-,(líi, líz) - ~
(r f az)~z f rEk'z(Ki, I{z) - ~
-C,(h) f ~~ - 6
-C2(Iz) f ~z - 6
Then the Jacobian of the canonical system evaluated at the equilibrium has the following
furni:
J-
-a~ 0 1~Cï 0
0 -az 0 1~C2
-4" -F rEh-,K, rEh,F., r f a~ 0
rE~.,h, rGh,F-, 0 r-} az
(16)
'I'hc~ dctcnninant of Lhc~ .lacobian ~waluati~d at the stc~ady st.atc is given by the cxpression:
detJ - a~az(rtai)(r~az)f




-}C'C2 (Is1h'~h'i Ish~zh-, - Lh.~h,) ~ Q (17)According to reichtinger and Hartl (1956, Theorern 5.4) we have saddle-point stability
with monotonic rnotions if the Collowing conditions are satisfied:
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TEh'x~,', l TEF,K~ ~ S~~ j
Iti -- C,~ - a2(r f az)J
f~- Cl - a,(T' f a,)J
G 0 (20)
To determine the sign of IC~~4 - det J we rewrite det J into (cf. Xepapadeas (1992)):
rl;h' h' r TGh ti- f S" l TzE2
det J- - C,~' x-
az(r f az) I- C,~; - ar(r f ar)J - C,1C2' (21)
Due to (20) and (21) we obtain:
If2 - 4 det J-~
L-TCkxFx - az(r ~ az)1
~-
z
TEh'~h'~ -} s~~ l l ~ 4T2i' iK~Ax
-[- c~~ - ar(r f ar )J1
f G,,,C~~ ~ 0 (22)
~ i z
We conclude that conditions (18) and (19) are satisfied so that the equilibrium is a
saddle-point which is approached in a monotonic way.3.2 Optimal investment policies
The firm's equilibrium values of the productive and abatement capital stock satisfy:
S~(tii ) - (r -f ar)Ci(arlíi ) -f rEx~(hi ~ hx) (23)
-rER'~(I~i, Iís) - (r f ax)Cs(asKz) (24)
For both capital stocks it holds that in equilibrium marginal revenue equals marginal
cost. Cornparcd to thc standard invcstment modcls with convcx investment costs (e.g.
Takayama (1985), pp. 698-699), here marginal cost of productive investment has in-
creased with rEh-,. This is because owning an additional unit of productive capital
stock increases pollution with E~, so that additional tax must be paid at the expense
of rEF,. We conclude that introducing a tax on pollution results in a lower equilibrium
value of productíve capital stock, and thus in a lower level of production and pollution.
The marginal revenue of abatement capital stock consists of a decrease in taxation ex-
penses due to thc fact that the extra unit of abatement capital stock reduces pollution.
Comparative static analysis shows that, surprisingly enough, the level of pollution in
equilibrium does not necessarily decrease when the pollution tax rate increases. But,
from comparative dynamic analysis we can conclude that cumulative discounted pollu-
tion certainly decreases with increasing pollution tax rate (cf. Xepapadeas (1992), pp.
264-266).
Let us assume for the moment that the productive investment rate is positive. Then,
after solving the differential equation (11), substituting (9) (with rfr - 0) into this rela-
tion, and using (23) as a fixcd point, we derive that at each moment of time the level of
productive investment must satisfy
1
,x,{S"(Ki(s)) - rl;ti-~(Iíi(s), h2(s))}
exp(-(a~ t r)(s - t))ds - C~(lr(t)) - 0 (25)
whcrc thc Icfl.-haud sidc is thc "net prescnt valuc of marginal investmcnt". For an intcr-
pretation cousider the acyuisitiou of an extra w~it of capital at time l. 'fhe firm incurs an
extra expense at timc t in arnount of marginal investment cost C~. On the other hand,
the rnarginal unit of productive capital generates - as of time t- a stream of cash flows
consisting of revenue from selling products (S') minus pollution tax payments (rEK,).10
This cash flow strearn is corrected for depreciation by multiplication by exp(-ar(s - t))
and is discounted to time t by multiplication by exp(-r(s - l)). Condition (25) states
that the nct prescnt valuc of marginal productive invcstmenL equals zero. Hence, the
optimal level of productive investment satisfies the fundamental economic principle of
balancing marginal revenue with marginal expenses.
If the productive investment rate equals zero (25) changes into:
-rlr - f W{S'(!í r(s)) - rEk-,(Iír(s), K2(s))} exp(-(ar ~ r)(s - t))ds - Ci(0) (26)
This expression shows that the firm does not invest when the net present value of
rnarginal invcstrncnt is negative. 1'his makes sense, because now rnarginal expenses
exceed marginal revenue. (26) shows that it will be optimal to have a zero productive
investment rate when the productive capital stock is large and the abatement capital
stock is low.
From (10), (12) and (24) we obtain that a positive abatement investment rate always
satisfies the following equation:
1~ -rEh~z(lír(s), Kx(s)) exp(-(as f r)(s - t))ds - Cz(12(t)) - 0 (27)
r
(27) implies that thre level of abatement investments is such that marginal abatement
investment expenses (C2) balance the discounted decrease in pollution tax payments over
the whole planning period, caused by an extra unit of abatement investment carried out
aL Lime t. We conclnde that the net present value of marginal abatement investment
eyuals zero. Aualogous Lo the case of productive invcstment it holds that abatement
investment will be zero whenever this net present value is negative.
3.3 Phase plane analysis
Linearization of (2), (3), (II) and (12) around the steady state yields the following
system
i - J(z - z'), (28)
where z -(lír,lti2,ar,az)T E R', z' is the stationary state and J is the Jacobian
presented in (16). A general solution is of the form11
4
z(t) - ~ c;z; exp(~;t) ~- z', (29)
~-i
where ~~, ~zi ~3i ~q are the eigenvalues of J and z~, zz, z3, zq are the corresponding eigen-
vectors, as far as all ~; have multiplicity 1. For this model the latter is assured by
inequality (22) (cf. eqn. (5.36) of Feichtinger and Hartl (1986)).
Because conditions (18) and (19) are satisfied, we know from Theorem 5.4 of Feichtinger
and Hartl (1986) that all eigenvalues are real, with t,,z G 0 and 13,q ~ 0. For all solutions
in Lhc stablc, rnanifol~l iL holds t.hat cs - cq - 0 in (29). Othc~rwisc thc solution would
explode, because ~3,q ~ 0.
If we only consider the first two coordinates of the linearized system, and we set the
second coordinates of z~ and zz equal to unity (this can be done without any objection
since the eigenvectors are unique only up to a scalar multiple), we obtain:
K~ r ~i~ "1~ ~í~
~ K ~- c~ exP(~it) I 1~ f cz exP(~zt) ~1 f K,
z ` z
After differentiation of (30) w.r.t. time we get:
r K~ r z~i zz~
I Kz ~-~~ci exP(~~t) I 1~ f~zczexP(~zt) 1
Next, (30) may be solved for cl exp(~lt), cz exp(~zt),
IC~ - Iíi - zx~(Kz - Kz)
c~ exp({~t) - ,
zii - zzi
zii(~íz - Kz) -(K~ - líi)
czexP(~zt) - , z~l - zn
and substituting from (32), we may write (31) as:
r tíi ~ - ~ - ( fi-ii -fz-xi -ii-ziÍfz -fi) ~ ( Ki - tí'










,;',-o - aK,~aK, - z~~z2~(~z - f~)
dlí2 -alíZ~aK, i;z - ~,
dK, Kl-o - a1Cz~aK2 - fzzii - ~izzi
(34)
(35)
To calculate these slopes we have to restrict our attention to the case where r- 0.
Furthcrrnorc, Lu simplify thc Lcvlious ca~c'ulxtiuns wc imposc Lhat a, - az - n. By
following the method employed in Turnovsky (1981) we can show that the slopes of the
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so that the lí, - 0 isocline is steeper than the Iíz - 0 isocline.
Now, we arc ready to draw the phase diagram, which is done in Figure 1. The line
K, - 0 traccs out thc combinations of K, and lí2 for which lí, is stationary. Likewise
lí2 - 0 is tlie locus of combinations uf lí, and Iíz corresponding to stationary values
of Ií2. Tt~ese two lincs divide the (lí,, Kz)-space into four quadrants. Above the line
IC, - 0, K, ~ 0, while below it K, C 0. Similarly above the line KZ - 0, K2 G 0, while
below it KZ 1 0. Accordingly, the overall adjustment of the system in the four regions
is in the directions indicated by the arrows.
(Insert Figure 1 about here]13
For reasons of surveyability we have only drawn those trajectories where abatement
capital stock increases all the way and where productive capital stock is not very large
in the beginning of the trajectory. We see that then both productive and abatement
capital stock increase on the final path that ends at the equilibrium. This policy can
be preceeded by a phase where !~r decreases (productive investment can even be zero
(cf. eqn. (26))) when ICr is large, initially (trajectory (a)). Trajectory (a) could be the
final phase of a solution where, at time zero, the firrn is at its unregulated equilibrium
at the moment that thc government imposes a pollution tax (the unregulated steady
statc satisfies eqn. (23) without the term rEk.,. This makes that ICr is larger in the
unregulated equilibrium compared to the regulated one). Remember that the phase
diagrarn only holds locally around the steady state.
4 Marketable permits model
The implementation of marketable permits involves several steps (cf. Hahn (1989)).
First, a target level of environmental quality is established. Next this level of environ-
mental quality is defined in terms of total allowable pollution. Permits are then allocated
to firms, with each permit enabling the owner to pollute a specified amount. Firms are
allowed to trade Lhese permits among themselves.
In the USA t}rere has been some limited experience with programs of marketable permits
for the regulation of air and water quality, while in Europe there is hardly no experi-
ence with rnarketable permits. The major program of imposing marketable permits as
a mechanism for providing economic incentives for pollution control in the USA is the
Environmental Protection Agency's Emissions Trading Program for the regulation of air
quality (see Tictenberg (1985)).
I:xisl,ing systi~ins uf iua.rkctahlr prnnits in Lhc Ilnitrd SLatr~ r~rnbudy a kiud of "grandfa-
theringr scheme involving an initial distribution of pollution permits or "rights" among
polluters based on historical pollution. According to Cropper and Oates (1992) a draw-
back of this system is that heavy polluters are rewarded by receiving a lot of permits,
which they can then use either to validate their own pollution output or sell to other
firms. In this way the "Polluter Pays Principle" is violated.
Comparcd to a pollution tax system, a major advantage of the marketable permit ap-
proach is that it gives the government direct control over the level of pollution. Under
the taxes approach, the government must set a tax, and if, for example, the tax turns14
ouL tu bc luw, pullul.iun still cxccc,d pcrniissiblc Icvols. 'fhc govcrnmcnL will find itself in
the uncomfortable position of óaving to adjust and readjust the tax to ensure that the
environment is noL severely damaged (Cropper and Oates (1992)).
In this section we consider a firm that has to buy permits in order to be allowed to
pollute the environment. According to Siebert (1992, p. 142) marketable permits may
be defined on a temporary basis or without a time limit. We will assume here that once
a pcrmit is boughL it rcmains valid forcvcr (conl.rary Lo e.g. Lhe Wisconsin Fox R.ivcr
Water Permits which are only valid for five years (1[ahn (1989))).
If it has good growth prospects the firm will increase production and, after assuming for
the moment that abatement capital is too costly, this will also increase pollution which
implies that the firm needs to buy extra permits. These permits can be sold to other
firms aL thc momcnt. that thc firm reduces pollution by either a sufficient increase of
abaLcrncnt ra{,ilal sLuc k ur a rc~ductivn uf pruduc l.iun. If Lhc pricc uf a pcrtnit cyuals
p and the firm needs one permit per unit of pollution, then the firm's expenses on the
permiL markct aL time t equal
PF - P{Eh-,lír f F.h-,líz} - P{EF',(Ir -arK,) ~ En~z(Iz-az1íZ)}. (39)
Nuticc Lhal, sprndings turu inLu rccciviugs as suun .GS pullutiun dccrcasc~s ovcr tirnc.
Whether Lhc price of a permit, will go up or down depends on the behavior of all com-
petitors in the market. Leaving abatement activities aside for the moment, if all firms
want to produce more they implicitly want to increase pollution. Therefore, the demand
for pollution permits goes up and the price of the permits increases. Notice in this re-
spcct Lhal, Lhc :unuunt uf pcrn,it, on thc market is fixcd, which in turn leads to a fixed
Ievel of pulluLion generaLed by thc whole sector.
Thc above dcscription refcrs to a market for pollution pcrmits Lhat provides great flexi-
bility due Lo the absence of transactions costs and other obstacles to trading. However,
in practice the rules of the marketable permits can be so restrictive that the flexibility
they offer is more imaginary than real (see Cropper and Oates (1992), Hahn (1989)).
Nevertheless, in this paper we assume that trading barriers are absent on the permit
market.
Like in the tax model also here the objective of the firm is to maximize the net cash flow
stream:
maximize : I~{S(Iír) - Cr(Ir) - CZ(Iz) - pE(Ir,12, lír, If2)} exp(-rt)dt (40)15
The optimal control problem is to maximiae (40) subject to (2), (3), (5) and (6). Similar
calculations like in the model with a pollution tax lead to the tollowing results. The
upl.imal stoa~ly xtal~~ iti a solut.iun oÍ:
I, - a, Ií1 - 0
Iz-azlfz-0
(r -f ai)~i - S'(~~i) - a~PEr~'~(fíi,1~z) - 0
(r f az)~z - azPEtc~(k~, ~~z) - 0
-CI(fl) - P~-h,(~S i, ~~z) f~i - 0
-C2(~z) - PEKz(~~1, ~t7) ~ ~4 - ~
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rPEK,h, PEKstis
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-pzl;h~~.
7 - - ~.~
~pl:h-,h~z 1 p~;,,,,,, ~„~ -~ z(l,ll
z
(41)
Using the computer program Mathematica we were able to calculate the determinant:I fi








C„C„(EK,n, EKsh'i - Eti,Ki ) ~ 0
r x
The value of the number K(cf. below expression ( l9)) equals:
(42)
Pr Eh'z h"z pr Eh", h~, f
s,r 1
K- - C„ - ax(T } ax) f- C„ - a~(r f ar)J
G 0 (43)
z r
Comparing (4`L) and (43) with (17) and ('l0) we see that detJ and lí have the same
value in the tax model and the permits model when r- rp. Therefore, we can easily
conclude that also here conditions ( 18) and ( 19) are satisfied so that we have saddle
point stability with monotonic motions.
The firm's equilibrium value of productive capital stock is given by:
s~(~~ i~) -(r f ar )Ci(ar ~íi~) -F- rPEh', (K~', lí2') (44)
Ilcnce marginal revemw equals marginal costs, while margiual pollution costs equal
rpEh-,. This is because increasing productive capital stock with one unit during one
period raises pollution with Eh-,. Therefore, at the beginning of the period the firm has
to buy additional permits at the expense of pEF,. These permits can be sold at the end
of the period (notice that pollution increases only during one period) so that the firm
needs to borrow pEh-, dollars for one period to finance the permits transaction. This
increases interest costs with rpEh,.
Due to equation (44) we obtain that introducing a marketable permits system leads to
a lower equilibrium value of productive capital stock, which in turn leads to lower levels
of production and pollution. rurther, we see that the effects of marketable permits are
particularly significant when the interest rate is large.
At each rnoment of Lirne thc productive investmenL rate, whenever iL is positive, must
satisfy:
1~{s~(Itr(S)) - n(s)~h", (~r(s), ~x(s), Kr(S), ~íx(s))}
exp(-(ar f r)(s - t))ds -C~(Ir(t)) - p(t)EK,(lí,(t),Kx(t)) - 0 (45)17
Incrcasing I,ho prudu~~t.ive capital stock with onc nnít. results in immediate extra expcnses
in arnounL of margiual cosL U„ plus spendiugs on extra permits pEk-, needed to account
for the additional pollution generated by this extra unit of capital. It also generates -
as of time t - a stream of cash (lows consisting o( revenue from selling products (S') and
changes in future expenses on the permit market (-pE~,). Hence, according to (45)
the firm fixes productive investment such that the discounted cash inflows and outfíows,
which are due to marginal investment, are balanced. To state this differently: the net
pres~,nt. valu,~ uf inarginal invi~stin~~nt ,~qnals z~~ru.
1'he firm's equilibriwn value of abatement capital stock is given by
(r i- as)Cx(az~~z) - -rPEt~s(It~',Ifz")
while, for every time t, positive abatement investments satisfy:
- f~P(3)E~.~:(7i(S),7z(S),~~~(s),Itx(3))eXP(-(asfr)(s-t))def ,
-Cz(h(t)) - p(t)E~,(K~(t), Kz(t)) - 0
(46)
(47)
(47) implies tl~at marginal abatement investment expenses (C2) balance the changes in
cash flow on the permit market, caused by this marginal abatement investment. The
additional cash flows on the permit market consist of an immediate cash inflow (-pEK„
note that E~, C 0) and revenue~ expenses over the remaining planning period.
After comparing (23) and (24) with (44) and (46) we can conclude that a pollution tax
and marketable permits lead to the same equilibrium if it holds that:
rp-r (48)
To understand this equation consider the situation where pollution is increased with one
unit during one period. Then, in the pollution tax case the firm incurs an extra expense
of r dollars during this period, whereas in the markctable pcrmits case the firm has to
buy a permit in the beginning of this period that can be sold again after the period is
over. This implies that the firm has to borrow an amount of money equal to the petmit
price p during this period, which leads to interest costs of rp dollars. Hence, pollution
costs increase with the same amount under both instruments when (48) holds.18
5 Conclusions
This contribution belongs to a category of papers that attempts to determine the effects
of cuvironmental regulation on the growtli of an individual firrn. [t extends the analysis
of its predccessors (e.g. Kort, Van Loon and Luptacik (1991), flartl (1992), Xepapadeas
(1992)) in at least two ways. First, we incorporated a more realistic (but also more
complex) pollution function. With more realistic we mean that we explicitly deal with
the fact that for lower levels of pollution more abatement effort is required to reduce pol-
lution with some fixed amount. This is contrary to Kort, Van Loon and Luptacik (1991)
and Xepapadeas (1992) where it is, rather unrealistically, assumed that abatement costs
are independent of the pollution output generated by the production process.
Second, bcsides dcaling with a pollution tax as a form of environmental regulation, we
considcr the effects marketable permits have on the firm's investment policy. As far as
we know this is the first contribution where rnarketable permits are incorporated in a
dynarnic modcl of thc firm.
It turus out that imder both environmental instruments the equilibrium, where marginal
revenue equals marginal cost, is stable and approached monotonically. Imposing a pol-
lution tax as well as a marketable permits system decreases production and pollution in
equilibrium. Effects of marketable permits on dynamic firm behavior are intensified in
case of a high intcrest rate.
Uin'ing t.h~~ whuli~ I~lannin~; prriu~l Lhr ihwrlol~in~~nL uf prudnrl.iw, :4~; w~~ll :r.ti ahaLi,tni~nl.
capital stock is cornpletely dcterrnined by an investment rule that dictates the firm to
stop investing when the rret present value of marginal investment is negative and, when
this is not the case, to fix the investment rate such that the net present value of marginal
investment equals zero. Then the immediate expenses due to acquiring an additional
unit of capital stock exactly balance the discounted future cash flows, such as revenue
from selling products, as far as they result from this unit increase of capital stock.
After comparing the effects on the firm's investment policy of a pollution tax and mar-
ketable permits we concluded that long run firm behavior will be the same when the tax
rate equals the interest rate multiplied by the price of a permit. This rule is economically
interpreted and can be seen as a dynamic extension of the well known static result that
there are similar effects whenever the permit price equals the tax rate (see e.g. Baumol
and Oates (1988), P. 58).
Finally, we mention two intcresting topics for future research. First, it could be inter-
esting to consider a dynamic game of several finns operating on a market for pollution19
perniits. Such a G:unework cuuld Icad Lo stratcgic intcract.ions likc a firm that buys
mure permits than ncx~ded for covcring its pollutiuu iu order to obstruct the growth of
its competitors.
A second interesting model extension could be to consider permits of limited validity,
as oppositc to the model considered here where permits remain valid forever. Then the
value oí a marketable permit will depreciate over time and the resulting depreciation
costs will certainly influence the above described rule under which the effects of a pollu-
Lion tax and markcl.able permits are cquivalent.
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Appendix. Derivation of the relations (36) and (37)





~z-- -2 -2 Kz-4detJ
(A.1)
(A.2)
'I'he eigem~alue ~1 and its corresponding eigenvector zl have the following relationship
~IZI - Jzl, (A.3)
and this equation can be expressed as (remember that here we assume that r- 0 and
al - az - a):
-n 0 1 ~C~ 0
0 -a 0 1 ~C~
-S~~ ~ TEh-~h'i TEKiKz a ~
rEFzh-, rE~~hz 0 a
(A.4)
and solving for zll, we obtain
zll - {CY2(~I -a2)-TFh'ah.a},TEF~zh~,.
Similarly, corresponding to the eigenvalue ~z we have
zzl - {Cz(~i - az) - rEti.z~~z}~TEh-zr,,.
(A.5)
(A.6)
Using (20), (21) (where in both equations we put r- 0 and a~ - az - a), (A.1), (A.2),
(A.5) and (A.6) we may now establish the following expressions íor terms appearing in
(34) and (35):
~zzzl - ~IZII -
(~z - ~1)C~z Jaz t (TEh.,r,-, - S")~Cï f det J} (A.7)
TEn-,F-, lziizzi - -CZ~Ci (A.8)
Í~i - ~s)Cï z ~~
fszii - ~~zz~ - (a } det J f rEK,K,~Cs ) (A.9)
T EKz K~
Nuw, auLtil,iLul.iun uf (A.7)-(A.!)) iul.u (J4) and (:i5) li,ads Lo (3G) and (37).
Q.E.D.23
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Figure 1. Phase diagram in case of no discounting and equal
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